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MONEY ACROSS BORDERS
The panel was convened at 10:45 a.m., on Thursday, March 28, by its Chair, Cynthia
C. Lichtenstein,* who introduced the panelists: Jane W. D'Aiista of the Morin Center for
Banking and Financial Law Studies at Boston University School of Law and the Economic
Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.; Avinash Persaud of the Morgan Guaranty Bank; and
Patrick Juillard of the University of Paris I.
REMARKS BY CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN
At the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1945, the parties drafting the
International Monetary Fund Agreement had two major objectives, both centered upon
restoring the international community's capacity for exchanges of goods and services. To
do so meant mutual promises that, as soon as each member country believed itself capable
of returning to free convertibility, it would do so-but only for balances of its currency
earned by another country from sales of goods and services. Thus in the original, and
indeed present, Article VIII 2(a) of the Fund Agreement, each member promises (once it
ceases to take advantage of the Article XIV provisions for countries not yet ready to move
to free convertibility) that it will not-without the Fund's approval--' 'impose restrictions
on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions." Article
XIX (now XXX), Explanation of Terms, paragraph (d), explicates the meaning of "pay-
ments for current transactions," as turning in substance on whether the transaction involves
goods and services for which prompt payment is made between a resident of the country
concerned and a nonresident. There is no such promise to remove capital controls and
indeed, initially, the international community seems to have assumed that capital controls
would be used in appropriate cases. Thus the Fund Agreement (after the First Amendment)
in Article VI, Capital Transfers, provides: "A member may not use the Fund's resources
to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital ... and the Fund may request a member
to exercise controls to prevent such use of the resources of the Fund."
Another objective of the Bretton Woods Conference, besides encouraging the removal
of exchange controls that serve as a barrier to international trade, was to set up a fund
that could be used by countries experiencing balance of payments crises-presumably
because of difficulties occasioned by other than a "large or sustained outflow of capital."
In practice, as is detailed for the period up to 1977 by Sir Joseph Gold, the Fund tended
to urge countries to remove capital controls and did not, in utilizing its resources in balance
of payments crises, distinguish among causes for the balance of payments deficit.'
Nor, over the years, was it only the Fund that took the view that the progressive relaxation
of all monetary controls-whether on payment for current transactions or on investment
flows-would be good for the international economy. In 1961 OECD, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the club of industrialized nations, promul-
gated its Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements. In Article I (a) of the Code, OECD
members promised to "progressively abolish between one another ... restrictions on
movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation." More-
over, as all students of the European Economic Community (European Union) know, free
movement of capital is one of the four freedoms assumed vital to the creation of the single
market.
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But the original assumptions of the Drafters of the Fund Agreement-and even of the
liberalizers-concerned only certain types of movement of capital. A recent issue of the
Economist lists five types of capital inflows: official grants, official loans, private debt
flows, foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment.2 It is fair to say that the
Drafters did not even contemplate the last. Before 1985, the markets for private equity
capital were assumed to be national or at most-with all of the efforts of the Securities &
Exchange Commission at integrating U.S. and Canadian capital markets-regional. The
Fund's joint Ministerial Committee with the World Bank, the Development Committee,
in latter years has been exploring in a Working Group how to increase developing coun-
tries' access to private equity capital. But the form in which it might come was not really
envisioned.
The paper by Jane D'Arista gives the startling facts. It details the sheer quantum of
purchase by global investment funds of the securities of countries engaging in rapid priva-
tization and structural readjustment programs (so-called "emerging markets"). What it
does not detail-perhaps because her statements are only "anecdotal"-is the investment
approaches of the purchasers of these countries' securities. Of all the forms of inflows
listed, only portfolio equity investment (marketable debt securities held by investment
funds) can be equated to "hot money," capable of being highly disequilibrating. Official
grants, in contrast, are stable and would not need to be returned. Whether official or
private, debt is not due until it is due, allowing the macroeconomic managers to plan or
restructure the debt, if they will not and cannot pay. Foreign direct investment, which by
definition cannot be dumped on sale, will involve long, arduous tripartite negotiations
among the seller, the would-be buyer and the government. But if a government has removed
most exchange controls, and if it guarantees convertibility of not only payments for current
transactions, but also of domestic currency received in a sale of debt or equity securities,
then all the "spooked" investment fund manager has to do is to sell the securities for
whatever price he/she can get, sell the domestic currency proceeds of those sales for what
harder currency he/she chooses, and reinvest wherever it is deemed there will be a higher
return. Whether the country in question is maintaining a fixed exchange-rate regime, an
adjustable peg or a floating rate, if enough portfolio investors "spook," an exchange crisis
is inevitable, as it was with Mexico in December 1994.
3
In classical theory, when justifying the liberalization of capital controls, the behavior
of the departing investor is only the concomitant of the profligacy of the government that
had departed from the straight and narrow path of adjustment. Unfortunately, no one has
yet demonstrated that investment fund managers as a group are any more rational than
bank depositors, nor has anyone explained why it is they decide to run for the exit. Even
if the government has had a temporary deficit in the balance of payments, is the discipline
of a liquidity crisis the appropriate remedy?
It would seem that the Fund, in the case of Mexico, decided it was not. The rescue was
mounted with Fund resources-in amounts larger at the time than had ever been loaned
to any country-used to stem the outflow (and to ensure there was no question of transgres-
sion of Article VI, reserves were restocked). Mexico in return submitted to a highly painful
regime of getting its macroeconomic house back in order.
The international economic community had been alerted. There was, and is, considerable
international concern about the possibility that the Mexican crisis is not sui generis, that
such a crisis could be repeated in another country that has received, in the words of the
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IMF Principles of Fund Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies, "unsustainable flows
of private capital." The Executive Board of the Fund, on April 10, 1995, amended its
Decision on Surveillance to add such flows to the list of developments, those that "might
indicate the need for discussion with a member."
4
The G-7, the group of major industrialized countries that meets regularly to coordinate
monetary policies, devoted a good portion of its summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in June
1995 to the discussion of the Mexican crisis and what might be done to minimize the
possibility of a future crisis.5 The Halifax Summit suggested to the Fund that it create an
emergency financing mechanism. The Executive Board of the Fund, at its Meeting 95/85
on September 12, 1995, considered "a proposed 'emergency financing mechanism' (EFM)
which would strengthen the ability of the Fund to respond rapidly in support of members
facing a crisis in their external accounts and seeking Fund assistance." 6 Space does not
permit an adequate analysis of the elements of this emergency "procedure," as the Direc-
tors of the Fund preferred to label it, but the Chairman's summing up stressed that use
of emergency procedures would not be a guarantee against sovereign default. The docu-
ment does make clear that the Fund will, in its surveillance, its consultations with members
and all other procedures, pay considerably more attention than it has in the past to the
capital accounts of a developing country. The Fund has learned that the combination of
liberalization of capital controls and rapid privatization of an economy can be an unpredict-
able, if not explosive, situation. The elements of the "procedure" stress that the Fund's
response to a member's emergency will be determined in part by the degree to which the
member has been cooperating (read, "following the Fund's advice") all along.
7
Another initiative flowing from the Mexican crisis is most interesting-and it represents
a first for the fund. The ultimate governing body of the Fund, the Interim Committee, in
its April 1995 meeting, asked the Executive Board "to look into ways that the IMF
could help establish standards for provision of information to markets, which could guide
members in their publication practices." The Halifax Summit echoed the idea and called
for a procedure "of public identification of countries" that do meet publication standards.
The idea seems to be (although this rationale has not been articulated clearly) that informed
capital markets are likely to be less volatile; that the prompt, simultaneous release of
government statistics, prepared according to adequate and harmonized standards, will be
an antidote to runs by investment managers caused by leaks, rumors and the decision to
act on "inside" information before one's competitor does. At the least, the idea might
help inoculate against such runs. The Statistics Department of the Fund has responded
and has placed on the Internet, at gopher://gopher.imf.org, "Standards for Dissemination
by Countries of Economic and Financial Statistics, A Discussion Draft."
Finally, the larger group of industrialized countries, the G-10, has set up a Working
Group to prepare a report entitled "Sovereign Liquidity Crises," scheduled to appear in
April 1996, in time for the next meeting of the Interim Committee. It will be interesting
to see if that Report calls for reconsideration of the old freedom of countries under the
"rules of the game" to make their own decisions about capital controls-or if capital
controls will be seen as ripe for multilateral surveillance and approval by the Fund.
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